

Investigating an Outbreak of Legionnaires' Disease from Cooling Towers in Surrey, BC

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BACKGROUND




What is Legionellosis?

- Caused by Legionella bacteria
 - 90% of human infections are caused by Legionella pneumophila (Lp)
 - Serogroup 1 (SG1) most common variant
 - Further differentiated by sequence typing
- Three forms of disease:
 - 1. Asymptomatic infection
 - 2. Pontiac fever (mild illness)
 - Recovery in 2-5 days without treatment
 - 3. Legionnaires' Disease (pneumonia)
 - Presents as atypical pneumonia
 - Treated with antibiotics
 - 11-25% mortality rate

RISK FACTORS

Older adults (> 50) Males Smokers Underlying conditions





Where do you find Legionella?

Transmission and Sources:


- Common in freshwater and soil
- Examples of potential sources:
 - Nebulizers, CPAP machines
 - Hot tubs, shower heads
 - Cooling towers, water fountains



- Health risk when conditions promote proliferation + aerosolization
 - 25-45 °C, biofilm formation, stagnant water, nutrient sources
- Transmission by inhalation of aerosolized particles



How common is it in Fraser region?



5-6 'sporadic' infections on average since 2012




THE 2018 OUTBREAK



The signal: First Cases

Onset Date



Public Health Actions

- Environmental assessment of two city blocks
- Shopping Centre area revealed several aerosolized water source
 - No registry, so followed up with centre managers and operators
- Conclusions
 - Identified ten cooling towers at the shopping centre
 - Sampled all ten, in addition to other sources of aerosols





AND MORE CASES...



Further Support for Suspected Source Area

Date Symptoms Began


- Outbreak case
- Non-Outbreak case



LAB RESULTS ARE IN...



Out of 10 towers tested:



Legionella spp.

5

Legionella pneumophila

1

Legionella pneumophila SG1

2




COVERING ALL THE BASES



Enhanced Questionnaire Findings


- Descriptive analysis and GIS mapping based on enhanced interviews
- Identified most visits were within the vicinity
- Other commonly visited locations:
 - A nearby public facility
 - A large supermarket approximately 500m west





Checking for Other Potential Sources

- Health Protection team in partnership with City of Surrey worked to locate buildings within a 2km radius that could potentially have a cooling tower
- Exposure analysis based on where cases visited before they developed symptoms
- Based on this information and the distribution of cases, a nearby public facility and supermarket were investigated
 - → Cooling tower confirmed at public facility
 - Sampled immediately






Precautionary Measures

Letters recommending all building operators in the 4km zone to:

- Confirm presence/absence and operational status of cooling tower
- Recommend preventative maintenance





LAB UPDATE



More Lab Results


- Cooling tower results for nearby public facility:
 - Positive for Lp SG1!

Isolates obtained for sequence typing:

- Environmental isolates (2):
 - One of the two SG1-contaminated cooling towers at the shopping centre
 - the public facility cooling tower
- Only 2 clinical isolates
 - → Both ST109



Previous Cases Linked



FINDING A LINK




Sequence Typing Results

Case isolates: 3 of 14

→ All ST109

Cooling tower isolates:

- SG1-contaminated cooling tower at the shopping centre
 → ST1777
- the public facility cooling tower
 → Identical to cases! (ST109)






IN THE END




Epi Summary: Cases



- 14 outbreak cases [Aged 36 to 90 (median: 68), 50% male, risks/comorbidities]
- All 14 hospitalized
 - 7 required ICU
 - 2 deceased (14% case fatality)



Epidemic Curve






Geographic Case Distribution

Of 14 outbreak cases:

- 12 live within 3km of source
 - 7 cases within 1km
- All but one were residents of Surrey
- Nearly half reported visiting the source facility directly, and 86% of cases visited the shopping centre




Potential Exposure Locations (# persons visiting)

*case residence locations have been offset to maintain privacy

KEY CHALLENGES AND CONSIDERATIONS

Cooling Tower Inventory





Benefits of a Cooling Tower Registry

- Targeted interventions
 - Risk assessment
 - Expedite review of maintenance records and events (e.g. downtimes)
- Global interventions/precautionary measures

- The best intervention: Prevention
 - Monitoring and reporting pathways
 - Standardization of maintenance, testing and remediation



Source Attribution

✓ Public Facility Cooling Tower confirmed
 -ST 109 also in 3 clinical isolates

- One Shopping Centre Cooling Tower not typed
- ??? Other Shopping Centre Cooling Tower = ST 1777
 -not seen before in clinical isolates

 → Rare (EWGLI: 5 non-BC isolates)




A NOVEL TOOL




A Starting Point for Plume Modelling

- Range Roses
- Displays the maximum distance and proportion of time that the organism may have been dispersed from a source
- Maximum distance of travel is estimated from:
 - meteorological wind data ('wind roses')
 - Estimated survival of organism in aerosols
 - parameters known to impact survival of the organism (temperature, relative humidity, solar exposure)


Plume Modelling¹



Range Rose



Range Rose Interpretation



Range Rose from Implicated Source

FHA Legionnaires' Disease Outbreak June 1 to September 28, 2019

For ~8% of the time, Lp travelled a maximum of 1.5 to 2 km east from source

Range Rose Usage

When the source is **unknown**:

- Assessing likelihood of potential sources
- Identify areas for targeted source investigation


When the source is **suspected/known**:

- Corroborate observed case distribution around implicated source
- Assessing risk and mode of exposure
- Identify populations at potentially greater risk


Outbreak Range Rose

- Minimal dispersion of organism in a southerly direction
 - Particularly South to Southeast
- More than half of the time (60%), dispersion was within 2 km in the NE and NW quadrants
- Maximum travel distance was between 1.5 and 1.7 km on average


Range Rose from Implicated Source FHA Legionnaires' Disease Outbreak June 1 to September 28, 2019



Case Distribution



Example: Case Exposure Assessment



Summary

- Strategies, considerations, and tools available for investigating and managing a Legionnaires' Disease outbreak
 - Utility of global and targeted intervention strategies to overcome challenges
 - Range Roses: practical and useful tool for exploring dispersion modelling

 Knowledge of cooling tower locations via a registry can greatly expedite the investigation process and help to inform intervention strategies as well as prevention



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